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Inside Washington



Pentagon Papers Point Up Good Intelligence



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WASHINGTON — The U.S. intelligence community often criticized and recently under fire from presidential adviser, Henry A. Kissinger, emerges from the Pentagon study of the Vietnam war with its reputation much enhanced.

War critics will complain that, over the years of U.S. involvement, the Central Intelligence Agency is shown to have conducted covert operations in Indochina. Operational responsibility for such actions is an old controversy, of course, and those sub-rosa activities were ordered by a succession of U.S. presidents and their National Security Councils.

With respect to its major function, intelligence and its assessment, the CIA proves to have been very perceptive over the Vietnam years. The intelligence analysts read very well the indications of what might develop in Indochina as the United

States extended its commitment there.

Specifically, the CIA and the intelligence studies in which CIA participated, rejected the domino theory — the idea that the fall of Vietnam would topple Laos, then Cambodia and then other Asian nations — like a falling row of dominoes. CIA saw limited damage to U.S. interests from a Communist victory in Vietnam.

Additionally, CIA minimized the impact, in North Vietnam, of a restricted campaign of U.S. bombing. It thus dismissed the thesis of Walt W. Rostow that North Vietnam would be intimidated by the possible loss of its tiny industrial complex which had been painstakingly developed after the war with the French.

"INDIGENOUS" SUPPORT — Rostow, then a State Department official, offered his thesis in February 1964, when the administration was beginning to stress the controlling role of

North Vietnam in the war in the South. At that time, however, intelligence analyses were reporting that the primary source of Communist strength was "indigenous."

That CIA view, of a revolutionary Communist movement identified with nationalist sentiments carried over from the war with the French, was given little credence by President Johnson and his top aides, according to the Pentagon study.

In June of 1964 President Johnson asked CIA whether the rest of Southeast Asia would necessarily fall to the Communists if South Vietnam and Laos came under their control. That was an occasion on which CIA challenged the domino theory, asserting that "with the possible exception of Cambodia" no nation in the area would quickly fall to the Communists.

Again, administration policy makers were not persuaded, and fears for such nations as

Malaysia persisted in high administration councils, the Pentagon study reports.

In November of 1964, when the National Security Council was considering plans for carrying the bombing to North Vietnam, it was an intelligence panel — including CIA, State Department intelligence and the Pentagon's Defense Intelligence Agency — which said the plan had little chance of intimidating the North Vietnamese.

In the spring of 1965, when the discussions had turned to possible commitment of U.S. troops to offensive combat operations, CIA Director John A. McCone said a change in the role of U.S. troops was inconsistent with the limited tempo of the bombing operations then being conducted. He said the proposed air and ground pressures on Hanoi would not be enough.

"In effect," said McCone in an April 1965 memo, "we will find ourselves mired down in combat in the jungle in a military effort that we cannot win, and from which we will have extreme difficulty extricating ourselves."

STYLE CHANGED — In that memo McCone, the rather dour California industrialist who was brought in to revive CIA after the ill-fated Bay of Pigs invasion, showed himself to be a full participant in the formulation of U.S. policy. With the benefit of hindsight, one can wish he had been more persuasive.

145. Ban Nakhoua (present location: Ban Nalongkhoun).
 146. Ban Xieng houn (present location: Ban Nalongkhoun).
 147. Ban Nong Ha (present location: Ban Nalongkhoun).
 148. Ban Xieng Naa (present location: Ban Nalongkhoun).
 149. Ban Nai Houane (present location: Ban Nam Pot 1).
 150. Ban Noua Na (present location: Ban Nam Pot 1).
 151. Ban Khay (present location: Ban Nam Pot 1).
 152. Ban Nong (present location: Ban Nampot 2).
 153. Ban Pong (present location: Ban Nampot 2).
 154. Ban Sack (present location: Ban Nampot 2).
 155. Ban Bone (present location: Ban Nampot 2).
 156. Ban Xay (present location: Ban Nampot 3).
 157. Ban Hong Kong (present location: Ban Nampot 3).
 158. Ban Nato (present location: Ban Nampot 3).
 159. Ban Sam tay (present location: Ban Nampot 3).
 160. Ban Sam Neua (present location: Ban Nampot 3).
 161. Ban He (present location: Ban Nampot 3).
 162. Ban Vang Kam (present location: Ban Nampot 3).
 163. Vang Xienghoung (present location: Ban Nampot 3).
 III. Muong Phan (Tassengs The, Hat Nam):
 N. Tasseng The:
 164. Ban San Phan (present location: Ban Nong Pene).
 165. Ban Na Pa (present location: Ban Nampot 1).
 166. Ban Nlan (present location: Ban Nampot 1).
 167. Ban Phicngdy (present location: Ban Nampot 1).
 168. Ban Ka cheng (present location: Ban Nampot 1).
 169. Ban Hat (present location: Ban Nampot 1).
 170. Ban Xieng Klo. (present location: Ban Nampot 1).
 171. Ban Dong (present location: Ban Nampot 1).
 172. Ban Phoncsai (present location: Ban Nampot 1).
 173. Ban San Phan (present location: Ban Nampot 1).
 174. Ban Phone Ngam (present location: Ban Nampot 1).
 175. Ban Khanc (present location: Ban Nampot 1).
 176. Ban Tha Phane (present location: Ban Nampot 1).
 177. Ban Plat (present location: Ban Nampot 1).
 178. Ban Tat Luang (present location: Ban Nampot 1).
 179. Ban Chom thon (present location: Ban Nampot 1).
 O. Tasseng Hat Nam:
 180. Ban Hlo (present location: Ban Thath).
 181. Ban Nhoun (present location: Ban Thath).
 182. Ban Phone Phiep (present location: Ban Thath).
 183. Ban Hatio (present location: Ban Thath).
 184. Ban Poun Sane (present location: Ban Thath).
 185. Ban The Phane (present location: Ban Thath).
 186. Ban Ha Nhone (present location: Ban Thath).
 187. Ban Na Pa (present location: Ban Thath).
 188. Ban Kok So (present location: Ban Thath).

189. Ban That Luang (present location: Ban Thath).
 190. Ban Kouan (present location: Ban Thath).
 191. Ban Houm (present location: Ban Thath).
 192. Ban Phicngfay (present location: Ban Thath).
 193. Ban Nay (present location: Ban Thath).
 194. Ban Phon Ho (present location: Ban Thath).
 195. Ban Geo (present location: Ban Thath).
 196. Ban Nieng (present location: Ban Thath).

Total: three Muongs, fifteen Tassengs, one hundred ninety-six villages.

Mr. MORGAN (during the reading). Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that this resolution be considered as read. This resolution was printed in the Record last Thursday. I am sure Members of the House are familiar with its contents.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Pennsylvania?

There was no objection.

MOTION TO TABLE OFFERED BY MR. MORGAN

Mr. MORGAN. Mr. Speaker, I move that the resolution be laid on the table.

The motion to table was agreed to. A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

REQUESTING THE PRESIDENT, THE SECRETARY OF STATE, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, AND THE DIRECTOR OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY TO FURNISH THE TEXT OF THE STUDY ENTITLED "UNITED STATES-VIETNAM RELATIONSHIPS, 1945-1967" AND OTHER RELEVANT INFORMATION REGARDING THE U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

Mrs. ABZUG. Mr. Speaker, I move to discharge the Committee on Armed Services from further consideration of House Resolution 491, a privileged resolution of inquiry.

The Clerk read the resolution as follows:

H. RES. 491

Resolved, That the President, the Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, and the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency be, and they are hereby, directed to furnish the House of Representatives within fifteen days after the adoption of this resolution with full and complete information on the following—

the history and rationale for United States involvement in South Vietnam since the completion of the study entitled "United States-Vietnam Relationships, 1945-1967", prepared by the Vietnam Task Force, Office of the Secretary of Defense;
 the known existing plans for residual force of the United States Armed Forces in South Vietnam;

the nature and capacity of the government of the Republic of Vietnam, including but not limited to analyses of their past and present military capabilities, their capacity for military and economic self-sufficiency including but not limited to analyses of the political base of the Republic, the scope, if any, of governmental malfunction and corruption, the depth of popular support and procedures for dealing with non-support; including but not limited to known existing studies of the economy of the Republic of

South Vietnam and the government of the Republic of South Vietnam;

the plans and procedures, both on the part of the Republic of South Vietnam and the United States Government for the November 1971 elections in the Republic of South Vietnam, including but not limited to analyses of the United States involvement, covert or not, in said elections.

POINT OF ORDER

Mr. HEBERT. Mr. Speaker, I make the point of order that the resolution is not privileged under the rules.

The SPEAKER. Does the gentleman insist on his point of order?

Mr. HEBERT. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the point of order in order to give the gentlewoman from New York an opportunity to speak to the point of order.

The SPEAKER. The gentleman from Louisiana reserves the point of order.

Does the gentlewoman from New York desire to be heard?

Mrs. ABZUG. Yes, Mr. Speaker.

Mr. Speaker, I have offered a motion to discharge the Committee on Armed Services from the further consideration of the resolution, House Resolution 491, a privileged resolution of inquiry. As Members know, a resolution of inquiry asks for information from the executive branch. The rules of this House provide that a resolution of inquiry must be reported out of committee within 7 legislative days after it is introduced; this resolution was introduced on June 21 by 19 Members, including myself. More than 7 legislative days have elapsed since then, but the resolution has not yet been reported to the floor.

The resolution seeks information on a number of studies which the executive branch has prepared regarding our involvement in South Vietnam. The subjects of these studies include the history of our involvement there since the completion of the 1968 Pentagon study which has been the subject of so much attention in recent weeks; the plans for retaining a residual force of U.S. troops in South Vietnam after our combat troops have been withdrawn; the military, economic and political bases of the South Vietnamese Government, including information on governmental malfunction and corruption; and plans and procedures regarding the November 1971 elections scheduled in South Vietnam, including plans for U.S. involvement in those elections.

I think that it is important to note that this resolution is not designed to elicit any information which is essential for national security purposes. It does not request information on specific military or naval bases, equipment, operations, or defense plans. The studies which we are seeking involve solely matters relating to political decisions.

This is information which is imperative if the Members of this House are to fulfill their duties. It should normally flow to the elected representatives of the people, but the bureaucracy has decided to protect itself against having any of its mistakes or errors in judgment revealed by labeling as "Top Secret" almost everything in sight.

We need this information if we are to enact appropriate and meaningful legis-